Saturday September 21, 2024
The Editorial Board
Top: Tigray Defense Force fighters survey the wreckage of an Ethiopian Air Force plane downed in Mekelle, Ethiopia, June 23, 2021. (Finbarr O'Reilly/The New York Times) Bottom: Somali youth enjoy a day at the beach, playing soccer and boating near the coast under the Somali national flags, reflecting the country's enduring spirit amidst ongoing regional challenges.
In 2006, Ethiopia was the undisputed powerbroker in the Horn of Africa. Under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia thrived in an era of unprecedented political stability. The ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) held firm control, while the economy surged with an average growth rate of 8% per year, largely fueled by Western aid. Ethiopia's military strength and economic growth made it a key U.S. ally in the global War on Terror, giving it the pretext to intervene in Somalia.
Ethiopia's military prowess led its forces to invade Somalia to oust the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Backed by international support, Ethiopia appeared poised to reassert regional dominance. But instead of bringing lasting peace, Ethiopia's 2006 intervention birthed Al-Shabaab, a militant group that has since become one of the most dangerous threats in the region. The intervention failed to establish long-term stability, and Ethiopia's withdrawal highlighted its inability to maintain hegemonic control.
Somalia, at that time, was mired in chaos. The interim government clung to survival while Al-Shabaab grew in strength. Fast forward to 2024, and the tables have turned dramatically. Ethiopia, once dominant, is now wrestling with internal divisions and external criticism. Meanwhile, Somalia, once dismissed as a failed state, is beginning to stand tall, having recently secured a seat on the United Nations Security Council as a Non-Permanent Member in 2025-26.
Ethiopia's Decline: 2006 vs. 2024
In 2006, just five years after the 9/11 attacks, Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia was framed as a critical part of the broader War on Terror at a time when global fears of terrorism were at their peak. Heightened security concerns in the West led the international community to support Ethiopia's military incursion, as did Somalia's fledgling interim government. At that time, Ethiopia's military was strong, and its economy was growing rapidly, buoyed by foreign aid and investment. Ethiopia was seen as a beacon of stability in a volatile region. Prime Minister Zenawi was able to rally international backing by positioning Ethiopia as a bulwark against terrorism, and the Ethiopian army was deployed to oust the ICU, which had taken control of much of southern Somalia.
However, in 2024, Ethiopia's reality is starkly different. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's administration faces growing isolation on both regional and global stages. Ethiopia's controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland has drawn condemnation, and its internal conflicts—particularly the bloody civil war in Tigray and ongoing unrest in the Amhara region—have tarnished its once-stable image. Unlike in 2006, when Ethiopia had the backing of the international community and the invitation of the host nation, today Abiy's government finds itself increasingly isolated. The MoU has distracted Ethiopia from addressing critical security threats like Al-Shabaab and has instead shifted focus to territorial ambitions widely seen as destabilizing the region.
Back in 2006, Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia was viewed as necessary to prevent the ICU from threatening regional stability. In 2024, the ethics of a border nation embroiled in its own civil strife leading peacekeeping missions in Somalia is questionable. Ethiopia's vested interests and domestic instability erode its credibility as a regional peacekeeper.
Al-Shabaab's exploitation of Ethiopia's distraction
Though weakened, Al-Shabaab has seized on Ethiopia's distractions, using Ethiopia's territorial ambitions to stoke nationalist sentiment. By framing Ethiopia's MoU as an attempt at annexation, Al-Shabaab has bolstered its recruitment and rallying support. Ethiopia's actions, driven by economic motives, cannot be pursued at the expense of Somalia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and burgeoning stability.
The MoU risks igniting new conflict in a region long plagued by wars and humanitarian crises. The Red Sea, a vital trade route for 20% of global commerce amounting to billions of dollars, is a vital corridor for international commerce. Disruptions caused by tensions in the Horn of Africa could send shockwaves through global supply chains.
While still a part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), Ethiopia's participation in peacekeeping efforts is hard to reconcile with its destabilizing foreign policy. Ethiopia's territorial ambitions starkly contrast with the behaviour of 16 other landlocked African nations, which have peaceful access to the sea through neighbouring countries under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Ethiopia, however, appears to be seeking more than just access—it aims for a naval base and a sea corridor. This move risks reshaping the region's geography and igniting broader conflict, creating new divisions in an area already wrestling with conflict, food shortages, and climate shocks.
Somalia's Resurgence
In contrast to Ethiopia's decline, Somalia has been on the rise. In 2006, Somalia was seen as a fragmented state on the brink of collapse while Al-Shabaab gained territory. Internationally, Somalia was dismissed as a failed state, heavily reliant on foreign intervention to keep order.
Now, in 2024, Somalia is moving in an upward trajectory. The country has successfully completed its debt relief program, a key milestone that has helped stabilize its economy. In 2023, Somalia joined the East African Community (EAC), an important step toward regional integration and economic growth.
Furthermore, Somalia has seen strategic gains on the global stage. The United Nations Security Council recently lifted a decades-long arms embargo that had long restricted Somalia's ability to defend itself. This lifting of restrictions, coupled with the strengthening of Somalia's own security forces, marks a turning point in the country's ability to take ownership of its security and governance.
Over the last two decades, Somalia has transitioned from a fragile, transitional government in Baidoa to a permanent one in its historic capital, Mogadishu, strengthening its ability to assert its sovereignty. As it readies itself for the third peace support operation, AUSSOM, scheduled for January 1, 2025, Somalia has become more adept at navigating the geopolitics surrounding regional peacekeeping. The shift marks a significant evolution from its position in 2007, when AMISOM, the first peacekeeping mission, was launched with Somalia largely dependent on external actors. Now, Somali Security Forces are stepping into a leading role, with the African Union in more of a supporting position.
Proxy War Fears
Ethiopia and Somalia signed a defence pact in December 2023, just weeks before the Ethiopian MoU was signed, which Somali officials had hoped would enhance bilateral cooperation. Many Ethiopian troops in regions like Hiiraan, Bakool, and Galgudud operate under this bilateral agreement, not the African Union's mandate. This military cooperation is now at risk of being undone as regional tensions escalate. Somalia has responded to Ethiopia's MoU by signing security agreements with Turkey and Egypt—countries with their own interests in the Horn of Africa but long-term allies of Somalia. This worrying development is a clear indication of the fractures emerging in the Horn of Africa region. The region risks sliding into a potential proxy war, driven by Ethiopia's strategic missteps and desire for a naval base, which Prime Minister Abiy has openly stated will be achieved "peacefully or forcefully."
New Power Dynamics
The dramatic reversal of fortunes between Ethiopia and Somalia since 2006 reflects broader shifts in regional power dynamics. Ethiopia's internal strife and aggressive foreign policy, marked by the illegal MoU with Somaliland, has undermined its influence. In 2006, Ethiopia acted with impunity; today, its regional standing has been severely diminished.
Somalia, in contrast, has grown in strength, rejecting Ethiopia's territorial ambitions and asserting that no Somali president can bypass the constitution to cede territory. As Somalia continues to reject the MoU, Ethiopia's efforts to expand its territory are increasingly seen as a relic of the past.
The stark contrasts between Ethiopia and Somalia today highlight the unpredictable nature of power shifts in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia's once-dominant influence is waning as Somalia's resurgence continues. Ethiopia's failure to recognize these shifting dynamics, combined with its pursuit of territorial ambitions, risks plunging the region into deeper instability.
If Ethiopia wants to regain its regional standing, it must recalibrate its foreign policy and work towards regional stability through diplomacy, not coercion. Both nations—and the wider region—stand to benefit only if Ethiopia abandons its expansionist agenda and focuses on peaceful cooperation. Anything less will exacerbate regional tensions and further destabilize an already fragile Horn of Africa.