By Dr. Ali Said Faqi
Sunday May 17, 2026
Somalia appears to be entering one of its most fragile political moments in recent years. The constitutional amendments adopted in March 2026 have opened a deep dispute over governance, constitutional standing, and the future direction of the Somali state. The controversy has intensified further following the expiration of both the presidential term on May 15, 2026, and the parliamentary mandate on April 14, 2026, pushing the country into an increasingly sensitive constitutional and political vacuum.
For the public and the opposition, the amendments represent an attempt by the president to remain in power outside the spirit of political consensus that has long guided Somalia’s state-building process. Critics argue that the changes were never genuinely about reform, but about creating a legal and political pathway to preserve the current administration’s hold on power. As a result, public confidence in national institutions and constitutional governance continues to weaken.
The central issue is no longer simply about elections. It is about constitutional standing, trust in institutions, and whether Somalia’s political actors can still manage disagreements within a consensual national framework.
In this op-ed, we will attempt to examine several critical questions that lie at the center of Somalia’s deepening political crisis, including the future role of the security forces, the capacity of the opposition to challenge the current political order, the reactions of regional states such as Puntland and Jubaland, the implications for Somaliland, the evolving role of international actors such as Türkiye, and whether Somalia is heading toward deeper fragmentation.
Will the army remain loyal as the president’s legitimacy continues to erode?
One of the most critical questions is the role of the security forces. Somalia’s army may continue to remain institutionally loyal to the presidency, but institutional loyalty does not always translate into political unity. Somalia’s security sector operates within a highly complex environment shaped by clan considerations, regional interests, political loyalties, salaries, foreign partnerships, and internal power dynamics.
If political tensions continue to escalate, different reactions may emerge within the security establishment. Some commanders may remain aligned with Villa Somalia. Others may seek to distance themselves from political confrontations altogether, while some units could increasingly prioritize regional or clan interests over centralized authority.
History also shows that under prolonged political crises, sections of the security forces can fracture, with some officers openly siding with opposition movements or rival political actors. Somalia’s past instability demonstrates how divisions within the army can quickly transform political disputes into broader security confrontations.
Escalating violence in Mogadishu and across other parts of the country could eventually pressure the president to return to negotiations. Somalia’s political history has repeatedly shown that serious security deterioration can force rival actors back to the negotiating table after prolonged periods of confrontation.
The greatest danger arising from divisions within the security forces may therefore not be an immediate collapse of the state, but the gradual weakening of institutional cohesion and centralized authority.
Can the opposition transform political frustration into meaningful pressure?
The opposition remains politically active but organizationally fragmented. Its greatest strength lies not in military power, but in its argument that the current administration no longer possesses a broadly accepted constitutional mandate. Through legal arguments, political mobilization, and international engagement, opposition groups are attempting to frame the crisis as one of constitutional standing rather than armed confrontation.
Yet the opposition also faces serious limitations. It lacks unified leadership, a coordinated national strategy, and strong public mobilization capability inside and outside Mogadishu. Unless opposition actors establish closer coordination with Puntland, Jubaland, other influential stakeholders, and the public at large, their ability to significantly alter the political balance may remain limited.
What role will Puntland and Jubaland play in the next phase of the crisis?
Puntland is likely to continue presenting itself as a defender of federalism and constitutional balance, while Jubaland may increasingly resist what it views as federal overreach and political centralization.
But the political crisis may not stop at resistance alone. An equally important question is whether one of the regional states, particularly Puntland or Jubaland, could eventually take the lead in organizing a broader opposition conference aimed at challenging the political legitimacy of the current federal leadership.
If the political deadlock in Mogadishu continues and no meaningful agreement emerges, opposition actors could eventually attempt to establish a parallel political process outside the authority of Villa Somalia, particularly now that both the presidential and parliamentary mandates have expired.
Such efforts could include attempts to create alternative representative institutions or a rival political administration claiming constitutional legitimacy. Somalia’s political history has repeatedly shown that prolonged constitutional crises can produce competing centers of authority and deepen national fragmentation.
Will Somalia’s political crisis strengthen Somaliland’s diplomatic position?
Beyond the internal political struggle, the crisis will likely produce wider geopolitical consequences.
Every prolonged political deadlock in Mogadishu strengthens Somaliland’s long-standing argument that Somalia remains politically divided and unable to effectively govern its federal system. Continued disputes between the federal government and regional states, uncertainty surrounding elections, and constitutional disagreements further reinforce Somaliland’s diplomatic case internationally.
This does not necessarily mean widespread international recognition of Somaliland is imminent. Many African states remain cautious because of the African Union’s traditional position on preserving colonial borders and concerns over encouraging separatist movements elsewhere.
Nevertheless, continued instability and political fragmentation inside Somalia are likely to provide Somaliland with greater diplomatic visibility and stronger arguments in its international engagement efforts.
Will Türkiye maintain its current position or gradually recalibrate?
Türkiye has become one of Somalia’s most influential international partners through military cooperation, infrastructure projects, humanitarian assistance, diplomacy, and economic investment. Ankara’s support has played a major role in strengthening Somalia’s institutions and security capabilities.
However, growing anti-Turkish sentiment within sections of Somali society is increasingly complicating that relationship. Turkish influence in Somalia has largely depended on public goodwill built through visible development projects, hospitals, roads, scholarships, and humanitarian support. If Turkish backing becomes increasingly associated with internal political disputes, that soft power advantage could gradually erode.
Türkiye is now increasingly accused by sections of the opposition and the public of providing military support to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud during internal political confrontations, including allegations surrounding drone support when federal forces moved into Baidoa in Southwest State of Somalia.
These perceptions have been further reinforced by controversial fisheries, oil, and gas exploration agreements that many Somalis believe lacked transparency and public accountability. As a result, growing sections of the public increasingly view Türkiye’s support for President Hassan Sheikh as closely tied to protecting those strategic agreements amid concerns that a future government could revisit or challenge them.
Together, these developments place Ankara in a delicate position. The longer Somalia’s political crisis continues, the greater the risk that Türkiye may become politically identified with one side of a constitutional dispute rather than maintaining its broader image as a long-term partner of the Somali state.
For this reason, Türkiye should approach the situation pragmatically. While Ankara should continue supporting Somali state institutions and protecting its strategic interests, it should also gradually reduce the appearance of direct political alignment with any one leader while choosing to quietly encourage de-escalation and political stabilization.
Is Somalia heading toward deeper fragmentation?
With both the presidential term and the parliamentary mandate having expired, Somalia is entering an increasingly dangerous constitutional and political vacuum. The central dispute is no longer simply about elections or constitutional amendments, but about who possesses the legitimacy and authority to govern the country moving forward.
The federal government may continue insisting on its constitutional interpretation, despite the president himself having previously stated publicly that any changes related to term extensions would apply not to the current administration, but to the next one, before later changing his position.
At the same time, opposition groups, regional states, and other political actors are increasingly challenging the current political order, raising the risk of deeper institutional paralysis and competing claims of authority.
The greatest danger may not be an immediate collapse of the state, but the gradual erosion of national cohesion, weakening confidence in federal institutions, growing fragmentation, and the risk of increasing international isolation. Somalia’s recent history has repeatedly shown that unresolved political disputes can evolve into broader security and governance crises if left unmanaged.
Without a credible political settlement and an agreed electoral roadmap, Somalia risks drifting into a prolonged period of political fragmentation and instability whose consequences could extend far beyond Mogadishu.
