By Abdulkarim Abdulle
Monday June 29, 2026
Mogadishu on the Edge, or Sahan on the Edge of Objectivity
For decades, Somalia has struggled to emerge from the ruins of state collapse, battling warlords, terrorists and political fragmentation.
While most Somalis dream of a peaceful, sovereign, and united nation, some commentators and research outfits seem far more comfortable describing Somalia’s failures than acknowledging its progress.
Reading many of Sahan Research’s publications, one is often left with the impression that every attempt to strengthen national institutions is viewed with suspicion, while every political crisis is amplified into evidence that the Somali state itself is beyond repair. The story they tell is rarely one of a nation rebuilding, but of a nation perpetually on the brink.
At a time when Somalia is fighting to defeat terrorism, restore state authority, and recover from decades of conflict, analysis should be guided by evidence rather than assumptions rooted in permanent instability. Constructive criticism is essential, but repeatedly portraying state-building efforts through the lens of crisis and fragmentation risks legitimizing the very forces that have profited from Somalia’s weakness for generations.
The Somali people deserve analysis that recognizes both challenges and achievements, and that reflects their aspiration not for endless transition, but for a stable, united, and sovereign Somalia.
The June 2026 briefing, “Mogadishu on the Edge:
The Danger Has Not Passed” presents a highly consequential assessment of the political and security situation in Mogadishu. A close reading of the report reveals significant analytical weaknesses, evidentiary gaps, and framing choices that undermine its objectivity and overall credibility.
The most notable weakness of the report is its reliance on assertions and predetermined conclusions presented as established facts without providing verifiable evidence.
Throughout the “briefing”, it makes false claims regarding the intentions of government forces, the composition of security forces, the use of specific weapons systems, and the motivations behind military operations. For example, the report states that the assault on opposition figures constituted an unprecedented crackdown and describes the operation as a deliberate effort to suppress legitimate political opposition. Yet the report provides no evidence, Instead, readers are asked to accept the interpretation of anonymous sources and unverified accounts as factual truth.
A second concern is the report’s apparent assumption that opposition actors were exclusively civilian political participants.
The briefing repeatedly characterizes opposition figures and their supporters as victims of state action while devoting little attention to the fact of mobilization of clan militias and armed groups inside and around Mogadishu.
The report itself acknowledges “credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation” and describes political leaders relocating into clan strongholds accompanied by armed security personnel. Yet it largely dismisses the implications of these developments.
Any balanced security assessment would examine whether the concentration of armed actors, regardless of political affiliation, posed a legitimate public security concern.
The report also exhibits a tendency toward selective historical framing. It draws extensive parallels between the current situation and the 2021 crisis, portraying the present administration as repeating the mistakes of previous governments.
However, it does not adequately examine the substantial differences between the two periods, including ongoing counterterrorism operations, changes in the security architecture, evolving electoral dynamics, and the continued threat posed by Al-Shabaab. By emphasizing similarities while neglecting differences, the report risks producing a simplified narrative rather than a comprehensive analysis.
Another major concern is the discussion of Somalia’s security institutions.
The report argues that elite units such as Gorgor, Haram’ad, Military Police, and other specialized forces were improperly used against domestic political actors.
However, it fails to address a fundamental principle of state sovereignty: governments possess a legal responsibility to maintain public order and prevent armed confrontations within the state, especiaily wthin the capital. Yet the report presents only one interpretation, namely that the operation constituted political repression, while giving little consideration to alternative explanations grounded in public security, intelligence assessments, or force protection requirements.
The treatment of Türkiye within this context is similarly prejudiced. The report suggests that Turkish-trained units and assets were allegedly used against political opponents and argues that Ankara’s credibility as a neutral actor is therefore compromised.
This is the fact. Somalia maintains its own sovereignty and utilizes its forces and weapons in accordance with its laws, regulations, and public order conditions, we are not in a position to involve or consult any other foreign country in our operational and tactical maintenance of public order. The distinction between equipment supplied to a sovereign government and direct foreign involvement in operational decisions is largely ignored. As a result, the so called analysis risks conflating Somali government decisions with Turkish policy.
The report further adopts language that frequently blurs the line between analysis and advocacy. Terms such as “executive overreach,” “suppression,” “lawfare,” and “dismantling democracy” appear throughout the document. Such terminology may reflect the authors’ predetermined interpretation, but it also signals a selective position.
Professional security analysis should clearly distinguish between verified facts, analytical judgments, assumptions, and policy preferences. The report often merges these categories, making it difficult for readers to separate objective evidence from editorial opinion.
Equally concerning is the report’s recommendation that Somalia’s political crisis can only be resolved through external mediation led by international actors.
This conclusion implicitly minimizes the capacity of Somali institutions, elders, civil society leaders, religious authorities, and political stakeholders to resolve disputes through domestic mechanisms.
Somalia’s modern history demonstrates that local reconciliation frameworks have frequently played decisive roles in conflict resolution. While international support can be valuable, portraying external intervention as the primary solution risks undermining national ownership and Somali-led political processes.
The breiefing devoted insufficient attention to the broader strategic environment confronting Somalia.
The country remains engaged in a long and costly struggle against terrorist organizations. Any assessment of political events in Mogadishu should consider how instability benefits extremist organizations seeking to exploit divisions within society. Although the report briefly acknowledges that Al-Shabaab could benefit from a security vacuum, this consideration appears secondary to its broader critique of the federal government.
Ultimately, the principal limitation of the briefing is that it presents personal interpretations and selective judgements as settled facts, to privilege certain political narratives over others, and to reach sweeping conclusions without providing sufficient verifiable evidence. A more balanced assessment would have examined the responsibilities and actions of clan militias, and external stakeholders.
Somalia’s future depends on strengthening democratic institutions, preserving national unity, and ensuring that political competition remains peaceful. Analyses that contribute to informed public debate are truly valuable. However, to maintain credibility, one must adhere to rigorous evidentiary standards, avoid selective framing, and distinguish clearly between objective analysis and political advocacy. On these measures, the Sahan Research briefing clearly falls short.
Abdulkarim Abdulle Researcher
