By Abdulkarim Abdulle
Saturday April 18, 2026
The piece is a rebuttal of the article published in Ethiopia’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) which discussed the situation in Baidoa and misrepresented the narrative and the facts on the ground. While the writer tried to read local developments within a broader regional security framework, it ultimately rests on speculative linkages, selective historical framing, and a misunderstanding of the constitutional responsibilities of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The emphasis of the article seemed that federal actions in South West State (SWS) inherently risk empowering insurgent actors is not only analytically weak, but denotes intentionally ignited misinformation.
First, the article mischaracterizes the deployment or movement of federal forces toward Baidoa as a destabilizing act rather than a constitutional obligation of countering terrorist groups and eliminating their influence in the rural areas and the main supply routes (MSR). Under Somalia’s Constitution, the federal government retains the ultimate responsibility for defense, national security, territorial integrity, and the protection of constitutional order. The suggestion of the article that the FGS should refrain from acting to avoid insurgent exploitation creates a dangerous strategic logic in which the state becomes reactive to terrorist behavior rather than guided by constitutional authority and national security imperatives.
Second, the article relied heavily on the assumption that federal–state “tensions” automatically translate into operational advantages for Al-Shabaab. This argument oversimplifies the operational realities of counterterrorism in Somalia. Evidence from recent offensive campaigns in Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and parts of Southwest proves the opposite trend. Coordinated federal leadership, combined with FMS partnerships, has for the past four years significantly degraded Al-Shabaab’s territorial control, disrupted extortion networks, and increased terrorist defections. Thus, by attributing insurgent strength to the political activities, the article diverts attention from these tangible realities on the ground.
Third, the article attempted to connect the Baidoa situation to the Red Sea security environment, including Houthi maritime attacks and broader geopolitical tensions involving the United States and Iran. This linkage is theoretically and conceptually overstretched. While regional dynamics may influence Somalia’s security environment, there has never been verified evidence that maritime insecurity in the Red Sea has altered the tactical posture of Al-Shabaab in Southwest state. Such analysis indeed requires distinguishing between plausible scenarios and demonstrated realities. Conflating the two might risk transforming policy planning into speculation.
Fourth, the discussion of potential Iranian influence in the Horn of Africa introduces a hypothetical threat without empirical substantiation. the fact that al-Shabaab is aligned with al-Qaeda simply nullifies such connection. While al-Qaeda is factually sunni islam sect, the Islamic Republic of Iran differs in ideology which has the Shia sect of Islam. The discussion between the differences of Sunni and Shia sects on global foreign policies have separate literature in which the writer should have read well thoughtfully. One may question how Iran’s alleged support to Houthi may affect the situation in Baidoa? It is quite interesting that the the write did not work on her homework better, but depended on shallow narratives that serve specific agenda. Thus, introducing unverified proxy dynamics into the analysis may create unnecessary alarm while distracting from the group’s actual operational model, which is rooted in taxation, extortion, and local coercion.
Fifth, the argument that FGS actions over the Mogadishu-Baidoa corridor may weaken counterinsurgency operations assumes a zero-sum allocation of security resources. In practice, modern counterterrorism strategy relies on layered force structures, intelligence coordination, and reserve capacity. Federal deployments to stabilize the MSR corridors are routinely integrated into broader operational planning cycles. They do not inherently divert resources from frontline counterinsurgency operations. In many cases, they protect those operations by ensuring political stability in rear areas and maintaining unified command structures.
Sixth, the article’s framing of legitimacy is strictly narrow. It implies that legitimacy is primarily a function of political neutrality. In our national security doctrine, legitimacy is equally derived from the state’s ability to enforce law, protect sovereignty from internal and external threats, deliver public service to citizens, and maintain constitutional order. Failure to act in the face of dynamic circumstances can erode public confidence.
seventh, the treatment of Ethiopia’s role introduces a regional security lens that prioritizes external vulnerability over Somali sovereignty. While cross-border coordination remains essential, Somalia’s internal security decisions cannot be subordinated to the economic or strategic calculations of neighboring states. The primary responsibility of FGS is to safeguard national stability, not to calibrate its actions based on hypothetical regional sensitivities. Additionally, Baidoa should not be seen as a trophy in someone else’s geopolitical contest. The overall issue have been based on electoral legitimacy, federal authority, and Somali state building. Any attempt to erase Somali agency by forcing this into an external rivalry is misrepresenting the reality.
Eighth, the article has undermined the rationale behind the federal deployments in Baidoa corridor. The objective was not to consolidate political control in Baidoa, but rather to clear and secure Mogadishu-Boidoa MSR, and dismantle terrorist pockets and strongholds along the corridor.
This corridor has long represented one of the principal operational challenges to our national counterterrorism efforts. Its stabilization now marks a significant milestone that will enhance operational momentum and enable the alignment of forces for the final phase of offensive operations against Al-Shabaab. Strategically, this progression positions security forces to advance toward south, widely regarded as the group’s principal operational hubs.
Finally, it is important to note that the core difference between the FGS and SWS previous leadership centered on the implementation of the one-person, one-vote electoral model that had previously been agreed upon under the National Consultative Council decision. The administration in Baidoa repeatedly delayed the process, while citizens across the state consistently called for the timely advancement of the elections.
In this context, the FGS acted in accordance with its constitutional mandate and in pursuit of broader national political priorities and democratic commitments. The situation in Baidoa should not be interpreted as a convergence of uncontrollable crises or as a trigger for regional instability. It was, fundamentally, a test of state functionality. The FGS responsibility is to uphold constitutional order, maintain security, and prevent political disputes from escalating into violence or governance breakdown.
Therefore, the decisive and strictly lawful federal engagement in Southwest does not constitute a risk factor. Rather, it serves as a stabilizing mechanism, a critical step toward the realization of universal suffrage elections, and a forward-looking investment in statebuilding. The actual strategic danger lies not in federal action, but in hesitation, fragmentation, and the normalization of insecurity as a political bargaining instrument.
I would draw particular attention to the author’s concluding claim that a deterioration of security in Baidoa, or a potential resurgence of Al-Shabaab, could justify unilateral Ethiopian action to secure its borders without due consultation with the primary actor on the ground, the FGS. The suggestion that such action could be taken at any time introduces a serious and consequential premise, one that risks normalizing intervention outside established diplomatic and legal frameworks and could, in itself, generate unnecessary diplomatic tensions, in which such a time, Somalia will have its own say.
More broadly, the article appears to advance a narrative that questions Somalia’s capacity to manage the threats posed by Al-Shabaab and to safeguard the security of the Gulf of Aden. In doing so, it implicitly constructs a justification for Ethiopia’s pursuit of Red Sea access under the banner of regional security. Such framing diverts attention from the principles of sovereignty, partnership, and collective responsibility that remain essential to sustainable peace and stability in the region.
I would like to emphasize that modern analysis of the security situation in Somalia and the evolving terrorist threat can no longer rely on speculation, prevailing narratives, or misinformation and disinformation. Credible assessments must be grounded in verified facts on the ground and must take into full account the measurable progress Somalia has achieved in its counterterrorism operations for the past four years. Scenario development within such analytical frameworks should therefore be firmly anchored in rigorous fact-checking and evidence-based data.
Author: Abdulkarim Abdulle,
Researcher and Counterterrorism Expert
