By: OMAR M ELMI
Wednesday April 1, 2026
The Horn of Africa, located at the entrance of the Red Sea and along one of the world’s busiest maritime routes, has once again become a focal point of geopolitical competition. The evolving relations between Djibouti, Somaliland (secessionist region of Somalia since 1991) and Ethiopia illustrate the complex interplay of economic dependency, regional rivalries, and shifting alliances. At the center of this dynamic lies a strategic question: access to the sea and control of regional trade corridors.
For more than three decades, Djibouti has served as Ethiopia’s primary maritime gateway. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993 left Ethiopia landlocked, the country has relied heavily on Djibouti’s ports for its external trade. Today, it is estimated that over 90 percent of Ethiopian imports and exports transit through Djibouti, making the Djibouti–Addis Ababa corridor one of the most vital logistical lifelines in Africa.
Yet for Ethiopia, such dependence on a single maritime outlet also represents a strategic vulnerability. Over the past decade, Addis Ababa has increasingly pursued a policy aimed at diversifying its access to the sea, exploring alternative ports in neighboring countries.
One of the most significant developments in this strategy has been the rise of Berbera Port in Somaliland. With major investments from the Emirati logistics giant DP World, the port has undergone extensive modernization. A new transport corridor linking Berbera to the Ethiopian border has also been developed, and Ethiopia itself has taken a stake in the port project.
This strategy was further illustrated in January 2024, when Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) granting Ethiopia potential access to the sea through Somaliland’s coastline. In exchange, Ethiopia signaled that it could consider steps toward recognizing Somaliland. The MoU generated strong reactions across the region.
Both the Federal Government of Somalia and Djibouti strongly opposed the agreement, considering it a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Djibouti’s position reflects both its long-standing support for Somalia’s unity and its concern that such arrangements could destabilize the regional balance and alter existing economic corridors.
For Somaliland, the modernization of Berbera and the MoU with Ethiopia represent major opportunities to strengthen its economic position and international visibility. For Ethiopia, they form part of a broader effort to secure alternative maritime outlets and reduce dependence on Djibouti.
However, these developments also carry significant geopolitical implications. Djibouti’s relations with the United Arab Emirates have been strained since the government terminated DP World’s concession at the Doraleh Container Terminal in 2018, leading to a prolonged legal and diplomatic dispute. The UAE’s strong presence in Berbera is therefore often viewed in Djibouti through the lens of regional competition.
Relations between Djibouti and Somaliland have themselves undergone a noticeable shift. For many years, Djibouti maintained pragmatic ties with Somaliland despite officially supporting Somalia’s territorial integrity. Trade flows between the two territories remained active, and Djibouti even granted travel documents to certain Somaliland businessmen and political figures.
Recently, however, Djibouti has taken steps to revoke some of these documents, signaling a change in its political posture. The move reflects a broader diplomatic realignment in which Djibouti has strengthened its relations with the Federal Government of Somalia, which firmly opposes Somaliland’s quest for international recognition.
The regional landscape has further evolved as Somalia has recently distanced itself from the United Arab Emirates, accusing Abu Dhabi of political and security interference. This development has indirectly aligned Somalia and Djibouti on several regional issues, including their concerns over external influence in the Horn of Africa.
At the same time, reports of Somaliland seeking closer diplomatic engagement with Israel have added another layer of complexity to the regional equation. Djibouti, which maintains strong ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, has made clear its opposition to any unilateral recognition of Somaliland that could undermine Somalia’s territorial unity.
In this shifting landscape, Ethiopia occupies a delicate position. Addis Ababa remains deeply tied to Djibouti economically and strategically, yet it simultaneously supports the development of alternative trade routes such as Berbera. Ethiopia also maintains strong relations with the United Arab Emirates, which has become an important economic and security partner in recent years.
This balancing act reflects Ethiopia’s broader strategic objective: securing multiple maritime access points to guarantee the stability of its trade and economic growth.
What might initially appear as simple port competition is therefore part of a much broader regional transformation. Djibouti seeks to preserve its role as the Horn of Africa’s primary logistics hub, Somaliland aims to leverage economic development to strengthen its political legitimacy, and Ethiopia is determined to reduce its strategic dependence on a single corridor.
The result is a complex geopolitical triangle in which infrastructure, diplomacy, and regional alliances intersect.
For now, Djibouti remains Ethiopia’s dominant maritime outlet. But the rise of Berbera, the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, now abandoned, and the evolving alliances across the Horn of Africa suggest that the region’s logistical map may gradually evolve in the coming years.
Ultimately, the future stability of the Horn of Africa will depend on whether regional actors can transform growing competition over ports and trade corridors into economic complementarity.
If Djibouti, Somaliland, and Ethiopia succeed in aligning their infrastructure and trade interests, the region could evolve toward interconnected logistics networks rather than entrenched rivalry. However, emerging geopolitical developments, including the controversial recognition of Somaliland by Israel, risk introducing new security sensitivities and external power dynamics into an already fragile environment. In such a strategically vital maritime region, sustained diplomacy and regional coordination will be essential to ensure that competition strengthens integration rather than deepens fragmentation.
_________________________________________
OMAR M ELMI
Economist & Geopolitical Analyst of the Horn of Africa
