Abdulkadir Khalif, Special Correspondent
Although the TFG is not considered much of a threat to the Islamists, fears that the Ethiopian army could step into the fray, giving the ensuing conflagration a regional dimension, cannot be discounted. Given the Ethiopian presence in Baidoa and the country's ties to President Abdullahi Yusuf, it is unlikely that Addis Ababa will allow the Islamists to run his fragile government out of town.
An attempt to marshal international opinion against the Islamists by blaming the recent abortive assassination attempt on President Yusuf in Baidoa, where the TGF is more holed up than governing, did not produce the desired results. Neither did an early attempt to paint the Courts as associates of Al Qaeda terrorists bring down the wholesale condemnation that the TFG was banking on.
The US government, usually ready to support any anti-Al Qaeda cause, is apparently reluctant to embrace the transitional government, having borne the blame for the rapid growth in popularity of UIC after it backed a so-called counter-terrorism alliance of warlords.
According to the radio stations, the only deterrent against an all-out war between the Islamists and the warlords - should the TFG collapse - will be a political compromise at the peace talks in Khartoum or intervention by the international community.
The Sudan talks have so far not produced much result, but they have brought the protagonists together. Ironically, the main hurdle to the talks is the suspicion harboured by the TFG - which the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (Igad) seems to back - that the talks are sponsored by the Arab League, which is sympathetic to the Islamists.
At the heart of the standoff is the firm conviction in the TFG that Somalia's statehood can only be regained if a peacekeeping force is deployed in the country with a mandate to take on the Islamists.
The Court's top officials, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Shariff Sheikh Ahmed, do not hide their disdain for the peacekeeping plan, seeing it as ploy to weaken their position.
Besides, Ethiopia - which the Islamists view with great suspicion - is seen as the driver behind the Igad-sponsored troop deployment initiative. Despite their image as a unstoppable force, however, the Courts militias are no match for the experienced and better equipped Ethiopian army.
It is an open secret that the presence of Ethiopian forces in parts of Somalia has served as an effective deterrent against any attempt by the Islamists to overrun the weak TFG and the semi-autonomous state of Puntland in northeastern Somalia.
The TFG, Puntland and even the breakaway Republic of Somaliland are known to have discreet security agreements with Ethiopia.
In July and August, the Islamists took over large tracts of territory. Their militias advanced on three regions in central Somalia, namely Hiran, Galgadud and parts of Mudug.
When the advancing forces reached Banderadlay - 60 km south of Galkayo - and the regional capital of Mudug, which is 750 km northwest of Mogadishu, they met resistance.
A regional authority called Gal-Mudug was hastily set up and has proved to be an effective deterrent against any farther advance by the UIC. It is believed that the Gal-Mudug quickly established defence treaties with Puntland and Ethiopia.
Both the Islamists and the TFG lack the will to compromise, however.
The Islamic Courts accuse the TFG of being dependent on Ethiopian protection and seeking the support of Igad, which has no popular mandate in the country. The Courts say the TFG charter has no moral guidance and cannot serve as the basis for legislation.
The TFG may eventually find that it has to deploy armed units to act as peace enforcers and the consequence may be a bitter war between it and the Courts.
Should that happen, then a prolonged war would only produce an Iraqi-style insurgency, with major foreign players being Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, Kenya, Uganda and even Sudan and Yemen.
After Independence in 1960, Somalia's civilian government soon became mired in corruption and was replaced by a military regime in less than a decade.
The military ruled for over 20 years before rebel groups toppled it.
But contrary to popular expectation, the rebel groups proved worse than the military they had replaced as militias loyal to various warlords turned against each other and partitioned the country into clan fiefdoms.
Source: The East Africa, Oct.10, 2006